LOCKE v. FURZE.

When hardships shall arise, provision is made by law for affording
relief under authority much more competent to decide on such
cases than this court ever can be.
"In the eternal struggle that exists between the avarice,
enterprise, and combination of individuals on the one hand, and
the power charged with the administration of the laws on the
other, severe laws are rendered necessary to enable the executive
to carry into effect the measures of policy adopted by the
legislature."

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

-Exchequer Chamber.
LOCKE v. FURZE
The plaintiff, being in possession under an old lease, had an interesse termini
under a reversionary lease of the same premises from the same lessor. Before the
expiration of the original lease, V., claiming under the lessor by a good title,
repAdiated the reversionary lease, and subsequently granted to the plaintiff a lease
for a shorter term at an increased rent.
Held (affirming the judgment of the Court of Common rleas), that the ordinary
rule of law, that on a breach of contract the person injured is entitled to be put in
the same position as that in which he would have been had the contract been fulfilled, applied; and that therefore the plaintiff was entitled to recover the difference
between the value of the reversionary lease and that granted by V., although he
had never entered under the reversionary lease.
Ilureau v. Thornhill, 2 Win. BI. 1077, distinguished.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Common Pleas discharging a
rule calling upon the plaintiff to show cause why the verdict found
for him should not be set aside and be entered for the defendant,
and why the damages should not be reduced to a nominal sum.
In the court below a demurrer to one of the pleas was argued
with the rule, and judgment on the demurrer was given to the
defendant. Error had not been assigned upon that judgment, and
the appeal was now argued alone.
The case is fully reported 13 W. R. 971, 84 L. J. C. P. 201.
Garth, for the appellant.-The sum paid into court is sufficient
C'orM-PonLocX, C. B., BLACKBURN and
HELL. and PIGOTT,

BB.

MELLOR, JJ., MAX:TIN, CHAN-
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to cover the damages. Up to the 4th of December, 1864, the
plaintiff had a mere interesse termini and not a lease in possession, and the measure of damages is the sum which he paid for
the reversionary lease and the expenses of that lease. In New
York and many American states the rule is as the appellant contends: Mayne on Damages 98; Sedgwick on Damages 177
(ed. 1852), citing Staat v. Ten .Eyck's Executors, 3 Caines 111,
4 Kent's Comm., par. 475. [BLACKBURN, J.-Kent, in his note
to that paragraph, says: "The rule is now settled in South Carolina according to the English common law," so that he evidently
thinks that our law is opposed to that of New York.] The case
of Williams v. Burrell, 1 0. B. 402, is not on all fours with the
present case, as the plaintiff had been in possession for some time
under the lease; here the plaintiff has never had the term, and
cannot be said to have lost it. [MARTIN, B.-.obi'nson v. Harman, 1 Ex. 850, is a positive authority against you.] That case
was decided on the ground that the lessor knew he had no title,
and Hopkins v. Grazebroolk, 6 B. & C. 31,was decided on similar
grounds. The present case more nearly resembles .Flureau v.
Thornhill, 2 Win. E1. 1077. [CHANNELL, B.-It is-very common
to overlook the fact that this is an action brought on an express
covenant. Lord St. Leonard's has well pointed out the distinction between this class of action and that for money had and
received to recover back a deposit.] The lessee never having
had possession, cannot be said to have lost anything except the
consideration-money and the expenses of the lease.
Hellish, Q. C. (Archibald with him), for the respondents.This is a covenant that the plaintiff shall quietly enjoy the premises during the whole of the term, and differs from a covenant
for title, which is a covenant relating to the state 6f things which
exists at the time it is entered into. That covenant is broken if
the lessee has no title at that time, and the damages are the
damages suffered at that time. In the case of a covenant for
quiet enjoyment, there is no breach until the lessee is evicted or
prevented from obtaining the lease, and it is clear that the
damages are what he loses at the time of the breach, and not at
1 The passage to which the learned judge referred is in Sugden's Vendor ahd
Purchaser, where Flureau v. Thornhill, and the subsequent cases on this subject,
are collected and reviewed.
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the time the covenant was entered into. No doubt it was some
advantage to the plaintiff to get the new lease: if he had not
obtained it, he would be entitled to all the damages incurred by
the loss of the twenty-one years' lease. The question is, what is
the difference in the plaintiff's position ? He would have had to'
pay 1751. a year, and would have had a lease for twenty-one
years; he has now to pay 3001. a year and has only got a seven
years' lease. The question of the amount of loss he has sustained
has been decided by the jury, and it is submitted that he is in
law entitled to retain the verdict.
Garth replied.
MARTIN, B.1-I am of opinion that the judgment of the Court
of Common Pleas was right. The law is correctly laid down by
PARKE, B., in Robinson v. ifarman, and seems to be in accord'ance with good sense. In an ordinary contract, if one of the
parties fails to carry it out, he is liable to the other for the loss
he may sustain consequent upon the breach, and I cannot see why
the lessor in this case should not pay what would have been the
value of this contract had it been carried out. The case of
Flureau v. Thornhill has qualified the ordinary rule of common
law, and that case has been upheld by Sy]kes v. Wild, 1 B. & S.
587' and is good law, but it applies to an exceptional state of circuinstances. The case of Hopkins v. Grazebrook does not come
within the exception established by it, but engrafts another exception upon it.
BRAMWELL, B.-I also think that the judgment was right.
The question with which we have to deal is, on what principle the
damages ought to be estimated, and I think that on the facts
shown by the case, the plaintiff is not limited to the sum of 4001.
and the expense of the lease. It is a general rule of law that
when a contract has been broken, the party injured should be
compensated to the extent to which he has been injured by the
breach. Some authorities have been cited to show that this rule
does not apply to a case of this nature, and it has ben attempted
to make a distinction between this and mercantile cases. No
doubt, had the action been for money had and received, the

IPoOLLOCK, C. B., left at the close of the argument, after intimating that he
agreed in opinion with the rest of the court.

LOCKE ?,. FURZE.

plaintiff could only have recovered back the original consideration; but the present case is distinguishable from that, and is not
a contract in iri, or one which has been rescinded. It isa contract which the defendant's testator executed as far as he was
able to do so, and in the deed he covenanted for quiet enjoyment
during the whole term; and it is on this covenant that the action
is brought. I think that an interesse termini passed -to the
plaintiff, and that to entitle him to recover, it is not necessary
that he should have actually been evicted. The principle laid
down by the court below, that the plaintiff is entitled to recover
what he has actually lost, is, in my opinion, correct, and therefore
I think that this judgment should be affirmed.
BLACKBU N, J.-I think that the general rule is that laid
down by PARKE, B., and that the plaintiff is entitled to be put in
the same position as if the contract had been fulfilled. Where a
contract would give the enjoyment, of a particular thing, the
measure of damages would be the value of the thing lost. That
is clearly laid down in Bobinson v. Hiarman. There is an
exception to the rule of common law in the case of contracts for
the sale of real estate. The law as to real property is such that
a vendor may well be in doubt whether he has a good title or not,
and, therefore, it is prudent in him to bargain, that if he fails in
showing a good title he shall not be liable to pay full damages,
and to stipulate that the bargain shall be off, he repaying the sum
which has been deposited. The case of lureau v. Thornhill
shows that there is a tacit understanding that such terms as this
are inserted in contracts for the sale of land. So in Walker v.
Moore, 10 B. & 0. 416, PARKE, J., says-" In the absence of
9xpress stipulation about it the parties must be considered as
content that the damages, in the event of the title proving defect-"
ive, shall be measured in the ordinary way, and that excludes the
claim of damages on account of the supposed goodness of the bargain." I think that is the true principle, and that there is only
that one case to -whichthe exception applies, and is always understood to apply. The present contract is not a contract for Sale
but an out-and-out conveyance of ah interesse termini, and a
covenant which has been broken; and I can see no principle upon
which the ordinary rule should not apply. There is no case .in
the English reports to support the appellants' contention. In
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those American states in which the rule for which he contends is
adopted it may be that there is such a well-established custom to
this effect that it is tacitly incorporated, but if we were to hold
that there is any such custom here, we should be deciding against
the facts.
MELLOR, J.-The real question is what did the plaintiff, who
had got a lease actually executed, containing a covenant for quiet
enjoyment, lose ? It is clear that he was entitled to quiet enjoyment under the lease. The lessor had no title to grant such a
lease, and upon his death it is avoided by his successor, who
makes a new lease, upon advanced terms. It is to be assumed
that this new lease was the best thing that could be done, and in
ease of the plaintiff rather than against him. I cannot see any
objection to the mode in which the case was left to the jury, and
am of opinion that the judgment should be affirmed.

PIGoTT, B.-I have come to the same conclusion after considerable hesitation. I thought at one time that it could hardly
be said that the plaintiff had been evicted, because although the
lessor bond fide granted the lease, it turned out afterwards that
he had no title, and I thought, therefore, that the plaintiff had not
actually acquired any estate and could not claim damages for an
eviction from what he had not really had; this seemed to me to
be a fallacy, but on considering that the lease had actually been
granted to him, I think that he is entitled to recover.
Judgmeit .affirmed.
The fact that the title to landed property is evidenced mainly by written
instruments, the legal interpretation of
which often involves questions of nicety
and perplexity, is a sufficient reason for
approving the judicial policy, which
etablished the important principle in
the case of Flureau v. Thornhll, 2 W.
Black. 1078, that a vendor of real property who (without fraud) fails to make
out a title shall not be liable to the parchaser in damages for the loss of his
bargain. This principle has held its
ground to the present day, though an
inportant modification of the rule has,
not without symptoms of fluctuation in
VoL. XV.-4

the course of decision, been admitted.
The doctrine was accepted without challenge, in the cases referred to by Lord
St. Leonard's, and stated in the appendix to the Vendors and PurchasersBratt v. Ellis, p. 7, and Jones v. Dykes,
p. 9; and it seems also to have been
assumed as the ground on which the
damages were estimated in the case of
Johnson v. Johnson, 3 Bos. & Full. 132,
where a purchaser who had taken possession, but had not taken a legal conveyance, recovered from the parties beneficially entitled to the purchase-money
the sums they had respectively received
as the consideration for a messuage, &c.,
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from which the purchaser had been evicted
by title paramount.
However, in the case of Hopkins v.
Grazebrook, 6 B. & C. 31, it was held
that the purchaser of an estate, who had
resold in lots by auction, before he had
obtained his own conveyance, and was
unable to make a good title by the time
appointed, by reason of his vendor never
conveying to him, was liable to the subpurchaser, not only for the expenses
which the sub-purchaser had incurred,
but also for damages for the loss of his
bargain. Lord. TENTERDEN intimated
that he was not prepared to admit, as a
general proposition, that where a vendor
could not make a good title, the purchaser should recover nothing more than
nominal damages. His Lordship, however, considered this case clearly distinguishable from Flureauv. TAornill; as
there the vendor appeared to be the owner
of the estate, and when the objection was
made to the title, he offered to convey
such title as he had; here, the defendant
had put the estate up to auction before
he got a conveyance, a step he ought not
to have taken without ascertaining if he
would be in a situation to offer some
title; and having entered into a contract
to sell without the power to confer even
the shadow of a title, he must be responsible for the damage sustained by his
breach of contract.
In the subsequent case of Walker v.
Moore, 10 B. & C. 416, a purchaser of
property prematurely sold a portion of it
at a considerable profit after he had received the abstract of title from his own
vendor, but before he had examined it
with the original deeds, and, upon such
examination subsequently had, the title
was discovered to be defective,whereupon
the sub-purchaser refused to complete,
and the purchaser himself also rescinded
his contract; itwas held in an action by
the original purchaser against his vendor
that he could only recover the expenses
incurred in the investigation of the title,

and nominal damages for the breach of
contract; but nothing for the profit he
would have gained by the resale; nor
for the expenses attending the resale;
nor for the sums he was liable to pay.
the sub-contractors for their expenses in
examining the title. BAILT, J., said
that the purchaser ought not to have
acted on the faith of having the estate
until the abstract had been examined
with the deeds and found correct, after
that had been done he thought he might
have recovered the expense of any subcontract entered into, and If there had
been mata fldes (but not otherwise), the
profit to arise from a resale ; and PARXE,
J., laid it down that a jury ought not,
in the case of a vendor in-possession, to
give any other damages in consequence
of a defect being found in the title, than
those which were allowed in Fureau v.
Thornhill. And, as there was no fraud
in this case, negligence in preparing the
abstract-was the only thing that could
be imputed to the defendants ; and the
plaintiff, by exercising ordinary care,
might have averted the loss that had
arisen from that negligence.
The principle which is thought to have
been established by Hopkins v. Grazebrook was, however, fully recognised in
the case of Bobinson v. Harman, i Exch.
850, where it was held that a party who
agrees to grant a good and valid lease,
having full'knowledge that he has no
title, is liable in damages for the loss of
the purchaser's bargain. On the other
hand, in Pounsettv. Puller, 17 C. B. 660,
it was held that a sale of right of shooting by one who had only an equitable
right thereto under a written agreement
from the owner of the manor, but which
the latter refused to confirm, did not render the vendor liable to his vendee 'for
damages for the loss of the bargain, or
for the expenses of an abortive attempt
to obtain other shooting; and it was
said by WILLIAMS, J., that ignorance
of law (e. g., that an incorporeal here-
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ditament would only pass legally by
deed) was not that sort of misconduct
that brought the case within the rule of
Hopkins v. G,'azebrook.
The whole doctrine was again very
elaborately reviewed in the case of Sikes
v. Wild, 1 B. & S. 587, when the Court
of Queen's Bench fully recognised the
general doctrine of the case of Flureau
v. Thornhill, and the majority of the
court, consisting of WGHTmAx and
BLACKMURN, JJ., considered that the
case then under consideration was unaffected by the distinction established by
Hopkins v. Grazebrook. The Lord Chief
disagreed. He
Justice (CocxBuRN)
seemed to consider that the defendant in
Sikes v. Wild fell under that category
of persons who would be obnoxious to
the doctrine of Hopkins v. Grazebrook
and Robinson v. Harman, being "a person who, not having an estate, takes
upon himself to sell, in the expectation
of acquiring the estate in time, and
making out a title." The majority of
the court, however, differed from the
chief justice in their view of the facts,
and decided the case without impugning
the doctrine of Hopkins v. Grazebrook
and Robinson v. Harman; but BLACKanuit, J., said, "Though the latter cases
had been expressly recognised as binding
by the Court of Common Pleas in Pounsett v. Fuller, that court considered the
general rule applicable under such circumstances as leaves it very difficult to
say to what cases (if any) the exception
supposed to be established by Hopkins v.
Grazebrook still applies."
The principal case has again brought
the doctrine of these cases under discussion. The general rule established by
.Plureauv. Thornhill, and the distinction
engrafted thereon by Hopkins v. Grazebrook, were assumed by the Courts of
Common Pleas and Exchequer Chamber
as both remaining unimpeached.
It was admitted that if the case could
be treated as an executory contract, then

the rule of Flureatt v. Thornhill would
apply, and the lessee could only recover
back the premium and his expenses; but
the courts held that although this was
only an interesse termini it must be con,
sidered as a contract executed, in which,
being corroborated by express covenants,
the lessor was bound to all the consequences of the obligation lie had undertaken by those covenants. This case is,
it is believed, one of first impression, as
affirming the proposition that that species
of contract called an interesse termini,
although it may never have lost its inchoate character, and been ripened into
an actual estate, is sufficient to furnish a
support to which an ancillary and concomitant contract, such as a covenant
for title, may be knit and superadded.
Those covenants that run with the
land have always been considered as requiring an actual estate for their support
(Spencer's Case, 5 Rep. 17, and per
Lord ELLEnOROUGH, 1 B. & A. 607) ;
and, though after much doubt, it has
been held that estates actually created in
incorporeal hereditaments (being in fact
tenements) will attract the rule as well as
those in corporeal hereditaments (see
Bally v. Wells, Wilmot's Notes 341 ;
Earl of Limerick v. Keene, 2 Jones Ex.
Ir. 307 ; Afartn v. Williams, I H. & N.
817) ; but the reasoning on which these
decisions proceed has no bearing on a
case like a mere interesse termini, which
never becomes other than executory, and
by no construction could be deemed a
"tenement," and under which no present right to the land or any profits out
of it is vested, and therefore cannot be
such an estate in the land as the covdnantee ought to have in order that the
assignee from him of the same estate may
have advantage of covenants; annexed
thereto: Webb v. Russell, 3 T. R. 393.
Now an interesse termini has always
been affirmed not to be an estate in the
land: 2 rest. Cony. 215. It would
seem, therefore, that the covenant in
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Locke V. Furze could not have been
assigned, though the interesse termini
itself clearly might (Co. Litt. 46 b) ; so
that, if the lessee had assigned his right
under the interesse termini, the right of
action on the covenant would have been
lost ; for it should seem that, under such
circumstances, the assignor could not
sue: Beely v. Parrl, Lev. 154; Green

v. James, 6 M. & W. 656. The case
of Locke v. Furze is one deserving the
attention of conveyancers; and it may,
perhaps, appear not so easy to reconcile
the decision with established principles,.
as the unanimity of the two courts before
which the subjecthas been brought, would
seem to imply.-WSolicitors' Journal.

Vice-Oliancellor Stuart's Court.
LOVETT v. HANKINS.
An agreement to take, in lien of arrears of income, in respect of a life interest,
recoverable in equity, a certain sum, less than the estimated'amount of such
arrears, recoverable at law, is, in equity, void for want of consideration, and will.
not be supported.

THIS suit was instituted for the purpose of setting aside two
agreements, of the 2d and 11th of May 1864 respectively, the
first having been entered into between the plaintiff, Mary Lovett,
widow, and Thomas Hankins, her brother, who died between the'
dates of the two agreements, and the second having been signed
by the plaintiff after her brother's death at the instance of his.
representatives, who were the principal defendants in the suit.
The circumstances which led to these agreements being signed
were as follows :-Joseph Hankins, father of the plaintiff and
Thomas Hankins, by his will, dated December 17th 1823, directed
a sale of certain real estates, and bequeathed one-third of the
proceeds to Thomas Hankins, one-third in trust for the plaintiff
for life, with remainder for the benefit of her children (if any),"
and if none, as to one moiety of the plaintiff's share, to Thomas
Hankins absolutely, and as to the other moiety upon such trusts
as were declared of the remaining one-third part, which he bequeathed in trust for another daughter, Sarah Penner, for life,:
with remainder to her children. After the death of the testator
(which occurred in 1824) the trustqes of his will agreed with
Thiomas Hankins for sale to him of the real estate for 19,7001.
At the time of this gale Thomas Hankins only paid 13201. 10s.,
which went to clear off encumbrances on the estate. Of the
remaining purchase-money (18,3791. 10s.), a part, viz., 10021.,
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represented a legacy charged by the testator on his real estate,
and the ultimate remainder of 17,3771. 10s. represented the
residuary proceeds of the sale to be divided in thirds and appropriated as above mentioned. It was agreed at the time that.
Thomas Hankins should retain 5792Z. 10s. (being his own third
part), and should grant a mortgage to the trustees of the will to
secure the legacy, and also the two-third parts or shares of his
sisters, the plaintiff and Sarah Penner.
To carry this arrangement into effect, Thomas Hankins, by an
indenture dated 14th May 1835, mortgaged the estates to the
trustees for one thousand years, to secure the same sums with
interest at 41. per cent. Shortly afterwards the legacy was paid.
The plaintiff at the time of the hearing was about seventy-four
,years old, and had never had a child. Sarah Penner had children
who were interested in remainder under the will of the testator.
Shortly after the date of the mortgage above mentioned,
Thomas Hankins purchased the reversionary interests of all the
children of Sarah Penner, in the sum of 11,5851. (being the sum
in which the plaintiff and Sarah Penner were interested in moieties during their respective lives), and so became absolutely
entitled to that sum, subject only to the respective life interests
of the plaintiff and Sarah Penner therein. In order to raise the
sum necessary for purchasing these interests, Thomas Hankins
wis obliged to mortgage the estate, which he did by an indenture
dated 17th November 1852, his sisters, the plaintiff .and Sarah
Penner, joining therein for the purpose of postponing their
security for the 11,5851.
By another indenture, dated the same 17th November, Thomas
Hankins assigned all the rents and profits of the estate which
should-accrue during the life of the plaintiff and Sarah Penner
(subject to the mortgage of even date) to the surviving trustee
of the will of the testator upon tiust to satisfy and keep down the
interest to become thereaftei due to the plaintiff and Sarah Penner.
Sarah Penner died in 1853.
Subsequently to the last-mentioned deed Thomas Hlankins made
the plaintiff unequal paymenti on dccount of her life interest, the
income of which fell considerably into arrear.
Thomas Hankins died in May 1864, having made a will whereby
he devised his real estate to his sons, Thomas and William Han-
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kins, and his son-in-law, Richard Hobbs, in trust for all his
children (two sons and three daughters) in equal shares.
The bill stated that a few days before the death of Thomas
Hankins, his son William Hankins came to plaintiff and asked her to
sign an agreement to take 10001. (a sum less than the estimated
amount of arrears) in discharge of all arrears. The plaintiff
'was then ill and in bed, and supposing that her bWother, Thomas
Hankins, was in difficulties, and knowing that he was dying, she
consented to sign, and did sign, the first agreement, whereby she
agreed to take 10001. in full of all arrears, and Thomas Hankins
agreed to pay the plaintiff 10001. with interest at 41. per cent.,
on the plaintiff giving him twelve months' notice requiring payment thereof. And the plaintiff agreed to give to Thomas Hankins, on payment of 10001. and interest, a receipt for the arrears
of her annuity up to the day of the agreement.
The bill proceeded to state that after the death of Thomas
Hankins, William Hankins and Richard Hobbs induced the plaintiff to consent to give up her claim for interest on the 10001.,
telling her that it was the only plan to avoid leaving her brother's
debts unpaid, and she accordingly signed the second agreement,
dated the 11th May 1864, releasing her claim for interest
The plaintiff alleged that she was induced by misrepresentation
to sign these agreements, and that there was, in fact, no consideration for them. The tefendants to the suit were the two sons
land three daughters of Thomas Hankins, the respective husbands
of two of the daughters, and the representatives of the last surviving trustee of the will of the original testator, who was also
trustee of the securities given by Thomas Hankins for the plaintiff's life interest.
Malint, Q. C., and B. .logers, for the plaintiff,-contended that
the agreements could not stand. They were wholly 'without consideration. They cited Cumber v. Wane, 1 Str. and 1 Sm.
Lead. Cas. new ed. 288; ffeat cote v. Crooks8anks, 2 T. R. 24,
27; Fitch v. Sutton, 5 East 230; Cross v. Sprigg, 6 Ha. 552,
555; Peace v. H1ans, 11 Id. 151.
Bacon, Q. C., and De Zongueville (.ffard, for some of the

principal defendants, argued that there 'was a-consideration for
these agreements. Previously the plaintiff had only a generial
charge in equity for whatever arrears she could claim. The first
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agreement gave her a distinct legal right to a fixed sum. These
agreements were such as would be enforced at law, and there was
no ground for setting them aside in equity. They also referred
to Cumber v. Wane, loc. cit.
Archibald Smith, for other defendants in the same interest,
cited Topham v. Morecraft, 8 Ell. & B1. 972, and commented
upon Peace v. Rains, loc. cit.
Freeman and Phear, for the representatives of the last surviving trustee of the will of Joseph Hankins.
STUARIT, V. 0., said that he could not but hold that both agreements had been executed under such circumstances that they
could not be supported in equity. The counsel for the defendants
had not attempted to uphold the second agreement, but as to the
first an attempt had been made to show that it was founded upon
a sufficient consideration. It was argued that, before that agreement, the plaintiff had only a right enforceable in equity, and
that the effect of that agreement was to give her a remedy at law.
His Honor was not aware of any authority for saying that an
agreement to take 5001. recoverable at law for 10001., recoverable in equity, could be said to be founded upon a. sufficient consideration. Again, it had been contended that this agreement
was one which would be enforced at law: it might be so, but it
was not necessarily, on that account, valid in equity. His Honor
made a declaration that the two agreements were invalid and
ought to be set aside, and directed an account of what was due to
the plaintiff for arrears of her life interest.
It was decided in the leading case of
Cumber v. Wane, 1 Sm. Lead. Cas. 439,
that the acceptance of a smaller sum
cannot be pleaded in an action for a
larger amount; and this doctrine has
been so frequently acted upon in subsequent cases that it has come to be regarded as one of the non tangenda non
morenda of our legal system. But while
the lawyers of the present day display
such unbounded respect for the memory
of Lord CAMDEN (who pronounced the
decision in Cumber v. Wane), they have
engrafted so many exceptions upon the
original rule, that the doctrine seems to

be fast disappearing beneath the embellishments which time and legal ingenuity
have added to its own simple outline.
The first class of exceptions to the
general rule appears to have originated
in Longridge v..Dorville, 5 B. & A. 117,
where it was held that the doctrine in
Cumber v. WTrane should not be considered
as extending to claims for unliquidated
damages. This case has been followed
by a multitude of decisions founded upon
some microscopic perception that the
plaintiff's demand was a hair's breadth
more or less unliquidated, or was disputed: .Edwards v. Baug1 , 11 M. & W.
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641. The joint result of thedecisions
in Cumberv. Wane, Longridgev. Dorville,
and Edwards v. Baugh, accordingly, has
been that few cases of settlements of disputed accounts are not open to the objection that they are not strictly within the
letter of the ruling in Cumber v. Wane.
So that, to use the words of Mr. J. W.
Smith (Sm. Lead. Cas. 444), "If there
be any benefit, or even any legal possibility of benefit, to the creditor thrown
in, that additional weight will turn the
scale, and render the consideration sufficient to support the agreement." The
doctrine in Cumber v. Wane, in fact, appears to have been founded upon the civil
law, which inquired into the adequacy
of the consideration; while the numerous
exceptions to that leading case are more
in accordance with our common-law doctrines, which have always eschewed such
inquiries.
The greatest recorded departure from
the principle of Cumber v. Wane occurred
in the case of Sibree v. Tripp, 15 M. &
W. 23. The action in the former case
was on a promissory note given in satisfaction of a larger sum; yet, in Sfbree
v. Tripp, Chief Baron POLLOCK held
that the acceptance of a negotiable security may be in law , satisfaction of a
debt of a greater amount. This important class of exceptions is not referred to
by the learned compiler of the leading
cases, although the case ofSibreev. Tripp
is noticed by him. Mr. Smith, however,
refers to the converse rule, which is now
better established than when he wrote,
and is in fact undoubted law, that even
a liquidated demand, founded upon a bill
of exchange or promissory note, and even
though overdue, may be forgiven by word
of mouth, and a fortiori by the acceptance of a smaller sum. Mr. Smith
merely says (p. 444) that there is authority for saying this." But Byles on
Bills (p. 182) asserts that this has been
determined by numerous decisions. .Although he cites only two cases (Foster v.

Dawber, 6 Exch. 839, and Dobson v.
Espie, 2 H. & N. 79) in support of this
position, yet there is no doubt that it is
at the present day irrefragable, the gene-"
ral law merchant of the world having
thus superseded the doctrine of the common law, so far as bills of exchange are
concerned.
The principal case, though strictly an
instance of the application of the commonlaw rule under consideration, is in fact a
decision of a court of equity. In that
case Vice-Chancellor STUART has .held
that an agreement to take, in lieu of arrears of income, recoverable in equity,
a certain sum lesi than the estimated
amount of such arrears, recoverable at
law, is in equity void for want of consideration. This decision, therefore, is
in immediate contrast with the cases
placed by Mr. Smith in his third class
of exceptions to the doctrine in Cumber
v. Wane. To this class belong all
agreement? in which there is what civilians would term a novation 6f a previous.
debt, or, as we should say, a commutation of the mode of payment; thus a
thousand pounds may be commuted for
a peppercorn, or for a negotiable instrument of less amount; and if the new
contract itself, and not its performance,
be accepted in discharge of a previous
liability, it will operate as a novation
and satisfaction thereof, even though it
be never performed.
To this category may, we think, be
fairly appended every case of accord and
satisfaction where a less amount than the
amount due to him is accepted by the
creditor, a new remedy for its recovery
being superadded by the agreement.
This additional element has always been
considered a sufficient consideration for
an agreement by a creditor to accept a
composition of his claim. And even if
the debt were a specialty or on bond,
another bond has always been allowed to
be pleaded in satisfaction, though it did
not improve the plaintiff's security except

